Universals, Propositions and Concepts. An Argument For Realism.

Introduction

Nominalism, and more broadly, anti-realism, is the position that any abstract entity or universal doesn’t actually exist but rather depends on us for its existence, and so is mind-dependent and also materially dependent, insofar as the mind is often considered to be purely material. But is such a view defensible given the seeming necessity of universals and abstract objects? In this paper, I will be arguing that universals (as understood by a moderate realist), propositions, and concepts (UPC) can only be coherently understood given a realist position, while any anti-realist position cannot be sufficiently defended, which leads to extreme skepticism of knowledge and leads to the absurd conclusion that we lack any ability to communicate with each other properly.

The Argument that I will be defending goes like this…

P1 Nominilsim and Anti-realism of UPC leads to absurdity

P2 Realism of UPC doesn't lead to absurdity

∴ Realism of UPC is a more rational position

Definitions and Explanations

Realism- Realism is the belief that objects or facts exist independently of our mind

Nominalism- The idea that universals or general ideas are mere names without any corresponding reality and that only particular objects exist

Antirealism- The belief that the existence of facts and objects is dependent on our mind.

Moderate Realism: Unlike extreme realism, in which universals exist in a third realm, universals in this view exist in the substances themselves but still must be abstracted out by a mind to know what universal that particular exemplifies. This is because the form as universal actualizes the prime matter, and so the universal aspect is particularized as it is mixed with matter but still exists in some respect since a substance is a composite of form and matter. As a result, then, universals do exist in substances but still need to be abstracted out of things since forms are by their nature abstract.

Universals

Universals are abstract patterns that are found in two or more particular entities. Take the color blue, for example. Many particular entities could be said to be blue, like blue liquids, water bottles, flowers, et cetera. Now what is it that brings these entities together so that we can attribute the color blue to these various particular entities, or, in other words, what can be said of this and that particular thing, which, although distinct, still has something that seems to unite them? Well, the seemingly obvious answer is that all these particular entities seem to exemplify universal blueness. Let’s look at another example using triangles. We have this and that triangle, which is drawn on different types of material using different types of tools, drawn to different levels of perfection, and drawn by different people who are hundreds of miles away, and yet we still call this particular entity a triangle and that particular entity a triangle. Then there seems to be something in that these two particular entities have, that being the universal triangularity. With these two examples, we can break this down into an argument that goes like this: If pattern x can be attributed to entities b, c, d, etc., then pattern x can be considered universal insofar as entitles like b, c, or d all exemplify x, and so has x intrinsically (it does not need to be essential). As a result, pattern x applies universally to all entities that have pattern x.

Objections to such examples may vary, but it is often said that there are no universal patterns but rather only particular patterns. When we say that this and that thing is blue, there really is just this type of blue and that type of blue, but really nothing that unites them; rather, we just call them blue by convention. The obvious retort is why do we call blue things blue in the way we do, and what is it that is common between them that allows us to call each blue thing blue? The answer seems to be that all things exemplify the universal pattern of blueness that allows us to call things blue. Now there are two ways one may respond: that there is no commonality that unites them at all, but rather that such seeming commonality is just arbitrary. Another way one may respond is that they resemble each other but don’t say how. Let’s first deal with the former response: if one says that there is no commonality at all to unite them, and so nothing similar can be said of them, then they are completely distinct (law of identity). The issue is that if these two things we call blue are actually completely distinct, then they are completely different, so to call both blue even though they’re completely distinct is, to a certain extent, contradictory. Let’s take pattern z to be that which is part of particulars 1, 2, 3, et cetera, yet pattern z in particular 1 is completely distinct from itself in particular 2, so z≠z, which is absurd. As a result, pattern z can only be said to be part of one thing, since if there were multiple, it would then, as a result, lead to contradiction. So under such a view, blue could only ever be said of one thing, but this also applies to any pattern you could imagine, so triangularity (a pattern of triangles) could only be apart of one particular triangle (which particular triangle it may be doesn’t seem to be epistemically knowable), and so there are numerous other triangles that cannot be said to exemplify triangularity, or to take another example, rationality could only be attributed to one human. All of this is absurd though considering all humans have the ability to reason intrinsically and all triangles obviously have 3 sides and can be easily distinguished from those shaped with no sides or 4 sides, and so at least in some sense exemplify triangularity.

All of this tells us that there must be at least some commonality that these patterns have, and this then leads us to resemblance. To appeal to resemblance, though, leads one to appeal to universals or leads to an infinite regress. An issue was presented by Bertrand Russell in his book The Problems of Philosophy. Bertran Russell says, “But then the resemblance required will have to be universal. Since there are many white things, the resemblance must hold between many pairs of particular white things, and this is the characteristic of a universal. It will be useless to say that there is a different resemblance for each pair, for then we shall have to say that these resemblances resemble each other, and thus at last be forced to admit resemblances as universal” (Russel 62). So if a resembles b and b resembles c, then we have multiple instances of one with the same universal resemblance. Now if the nominalist says that all the resemblances just resemble each other and thats all, we are still left with the same problem at just a higher level because now we have multiple groupings of resemblance that resemble each other, but now we again just have “multiple instances of one and the same universal resemblance.” If they wish to do the same thing again, all it does is lead to an infinite regress. This shows that one cannot deny universals by appealing to resemblance.

Another argument for universals is that such patterns seem to be quite obviously true insofar as they seem to be something that we experience and attribute to entities all the time, especially in science. When we talk about humans, for example, we apply the term human to all entities that could be considered to be humans, and such labels are taken to be a sort of intrinsic aspect that applies to us, and as such, we as humans all exemplify the universal humanness. This same idea applies to all living and non-living things that we label and categorize, from rocks to trees to dogs. If we take an Aristotelian metaphysical position, we could say that what makes a tree qua tree is that trees all have the same universal form, and so anything with the form of a tree can be called a tree. It seems then that one can’t coherently deny universals, and trying to do so could lead to absurdity. On the other hand, acknowledging the existence of universals helps us make better sense of science and the world in general.

Propostions and Concepts

In this section, I will argue that propositions and concepts are objective and immaterial. First are propositions, which are declarative statements with a truth value (being true or false). Propositions as those that bear determinate truth values firstly must not be mind-dependent, for to be purely mind-dependent is to be subjective in full, yet the issue with such a belief is that propositions like “Triangles have three sides” or “Abraham Lincoln is dead” are both true statements objectively speaking, or in other words, such statements are true whether anyone is thinking about them or if anyone even knows if such statements are true or false. For the sake of argument, let’s say that somehow aliens kidnapped Abraham Lincoln from his grave, somehow brought him back to life, and kept him alive even to this day. Then the proposition “Abraham Lincoln is dead” is false rather than true, but this does not cast doubt on propositions being objective rather than subjective since propositions do not depend on what we say is true or false but rather, given objective reality, the proposition either is objectively true or false. Another argument for the objectiveness of propositions has to do with communication. If propositions were mind-dependent then communication as such becomes impossible since all such statements become personal or in other words the statement “the earth is round” although being represented by the same symbols for both individuals, could in their content differ to an extent that even if you say “the earth is round” and I say “the earth is round”, because there is no objective proposition with an objective truth and because the words contained in it to depend on the individual human being, the content of the statement could be different, and we would have no way to know what others are really saying or what others really mean since this would apply to all propositions and concepts. This, as a result, throws communication as a whole in disarray if one takes the position that propositions are mind-dependent, but because communication is reliable and because we do know what we mean for the most part, such a potion is irrational to hold. (Further reasons that go along with this argument will be presented under the section on concepts below.).

So if it does not depend on our mind, then what about the material world? Imagine the universe went out of existence. Is the proposition “the universe doesn’t exist” true? It would seem absurd to say no since the universe doesn’t exist, yet if it is true, then it can’t depend on the material world or be mind-dependent, for there would be no mind to think of it. This is also the case with propositions that deal with past events or mathematical truths since such things would remain true or false no matter what happens in the material world now, for mathematics is abstract and immaterial while past events already happened and so no longer depend on the present material world.

Concepts are objective and determinate (immaterial) thoughts that capture what it is to be that thing. First, it is important to point out that concepts are universals in a way, since when we think of the concept of a dog or a triangle, we are thinking of their essential features, what it is to be that thing, and so the particulars that fall under the concept have all the essential features (at least potentially if not actually). As a result, most of the things that followed from our section above on universals apply to concepts like the fact that universals are objective, but I will still add additional arguments to support the objectivity of Concepts. Concepts then can’t be subjective or material, since if such were the case, absurdities would follow. Take person 1 and person 2, who are thinking of the concept “triangle” and so are thinking of what it is to be a triangle, but such concepts, insofar as they are subjective, are dependent on each particular mind for their content. This means that person 1 has his own concept of a triangle, and person 2 has his own concept of a triangle, and since it only exists in your mind, it is inaccessible to anyone else. Although persons 1 and 2 are thinking of the same concept in name, the actual content of the concept could be different in all respects. Our knowledge is then thrown into disarray since such issues would apply to all our concepts. In addition to this, the contents of the concept, which differ between and depend on each individual person, even if drastically different and outright absurd, are just as correct as any of the other contents. If knowledge is the attainment of what is true and false, then if such a view is true, we lack any knowledge at all.

The next argument tackles the determinacy and therefore immateriality of concepts. Take “◬,” which on its own is just pixels on a screen (material) with no actual, determinate content to it. It could just be a triangle, or it could also be a hat, the Illuminati, the roof of a house, an arrow, et cetera. There is nothing in the matter itself that could tell you what it is, but rather only the person who created it could. This applies as well to “◬” drawn on sand, paper, or anything else; there is nothing in the ink, the type of paper, or the molecules that could tell you what it is, and so the actual meaning of it is indeterminate. Now since words are also symbols and scribbles, they, insofar as spoken or written, are indeterminate in their nature unless someone attributes to them a semantic meaning to the scribbles and sounds. Our minds (intellect), though, since they attribute the meaning to these symbols, are determinate (see James Ross, “Immaterial Aspects of Thought”). This also shows that concepts too are immaterial since they are determinate thoughts of the intellect. Take, for example, a 1000-sided shape and a 999-sided shape. While mental imagery cannot distinguish them since such mental imagery is fuzzy and indeterminate, conceptually speaking, it is not difficult to understand the difference. In his blog “Some brief arguments for dualism, Part IV,” Edward Feser says, “Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity, as your intellect grasps it, is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides rather than that of something that may or may not have straight sides or that may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact but rather indeterminate and fuzzy” (Feser 2).

One last additional argument is that it is absurd to say that I have my own idea of what a triangle is and you have your own idea of what a triangle is, but rather it is more reasonable to say that when we think of what it is to be a triangle, we think of the same thing (3 sides, 180 degrees, etc.). It’s hard to even make sense of what it would mean to say you and I have our own ideas of what triangles are (which is where the argument above comes in as our ideas become distinct in content), but such issues disappear if we say they are objective. As a result, saying that concepts are subjective casts doubt on knowledge, so it is more reasonable to say they are objective and determinate.

Conclusions

When we look back at the original argument that I put forth to defend, I have shown that the anti-realist position of such entities leads to absurd positions, and so to hold such views is irrational, while the realist position doesn’t lead to such absurd positions but actually makes sufficient sense of these entities, and so to hold such views is rational. It logically follows that a realist position is more rational than an anti-realist position.

Works Cited

Feser, Edward. The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism. St. Augustine’s Press, 2010.

Feser, Edward. Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. Editiones Scholasticae, 2014.

Feser, Edward. “Some brief arguments for dualism, Part IV.” Edward Feser, 29 October 2008, https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2008/10/some-brief-arguments-for-dualism-part_29.html. Accessed 3 July 2024.

“Kripke, Ross, and the Immaterial Aspects of Thought.” New Dualism Archive, https://www.newdualism.org/papers/E.Feser/Feser-acpq_2013.pdf. Accessed 3 July 2024.

“Law of Identity: Explanation and Examples.” Philosophy Terms, https://philosophyterms.com/law-of-identity/. Accessed 21 June 2024.

Ross, James. “Immaterial Aspects of Thought.” https://www3.nd.edu/%7Eafreddos/courses/43151/ross-immateriality.pdf. Accessed 2024.

Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy. Independently Published, 2020.